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Abstract: We present the results of a series of laboratory economic experiments 
designed to study compliance behavior of polluting firms when information on the 
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university students face emission standards and an enforcement mechanism composed 
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examine how uncertainty on the penalty affects the compliance decision and the extent 
of violation under two enforcement levels: one in which the regulator induces perfect 
compliance and another one in which it does not. Our results suggest that in the first 
case, uncertain penalties increase the extent of the violations of those firms with higher 
marginal benefits. When enforcement is not sufficient to induce compliance, the 
uncertain penalties do not have any statistically significant effect on compliance 
behavior. Overall, the results suggest that a cost-effective design of emission standards 
should consider including public and complete information on the penalties for 
violations.  
Keywords: uncertainty, penalty, emission standard, economic experiment 
 
JEL Classification: C91, L51, Q58, K42  
 
 
*Corresponding author, Facultad de Economía y Negocios, Universidad de Talca, Of. 
248-FEN, Avenida Lircay s/n, Talca, Chile.  
  
2 
 
1. Introduction  
Enforcement to induce compliance is a key element of the regulatory process. In the 
conventional model of enforcement (Becker, 1968), the regulated entity is an expected 
profit maximizer who, when deciding whether to comply with a norm, compares the 
marginal costs of complying with the marginal expected benefit of not complying. In 
this model, the regulator has two instruments to induce deterrence: inspections (to detect 
violations) and penalties (to sanction discovered violations). The regulated population, 
on the other side, has perfect information on the probability of being inspected, the 
penalties associated with every offense and responds accordingly. In the case of the 
classical models of enforcement of emission standards, which is our motivation, there is 
a one-to-one correspondence between the level of emissions in excess of the standard 
(the violation) and the amount of the fine, and the polluting firms know this 
correspondence (Harford, 1978; Heyes (2000); Stranlund et. al., 2002). 
In the real world, this one-to-one correspondence between a given level of 
violation and the amount of the fine is not always observed. For example, in the 
Emissions Compensation Program of Santiago, Chile, the consequences of being found 
out of compliance vary between a written warning, a monetary penalty or a temporary 
closure. At the same time, the amount of the monetary penalties may fluctuate over a 
wide range, with the amount finally imposed depending, rather idiosyncratically, on 
characteristics of the offense and the offender (Palacios and Chávez 2002). In Uruguay, 
the Decree 253/79, which contains guidelines for water pollution control, imposes 
sanctions that vary according to the type of offense and its recurrence. The types of 
offenses are determined by specific causes behind the discovered illegal level of 
pollution: not having a treatment plant, not operating the treatment plant correctly, etc. 
Moreover, the type of offense and the recurrence do not define a given level of a 
penalty, but rather define the range, while the actual penalty within this range is left to 
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the discretion of the inspector and the political will of officials. The situation is not 
apparently characteristic only of developing countries. In the US for example, while 
under SO2 program EPA automatically sanctions any excess emissions above the level 
of permits holdings with a known and predetermined fixed amount of money per excess 
tone, under the RECLAIM program facilities detected violating their emissions permits 
may face a financial penalty which depends on several specific circumstances, 
including, extent of violation, reasons for exceedance, and even effort of the facility to 
correct its violation (Stranlund et. al., 2002). More generally, it has been argued that 
“the legal system does not persistently pursues predictability in sanctioning” (Baker et 
al, 2003, p. 447). Taken together, these examples suggest that the consequences of 
committing an offense if detected are far from being completely known by the polluting 
sources when making the decision regarding their compliance status.1 We refer to this 
situation as one in which penalties are uncertain. Certain penalties, on the other hand, 
are those in which there is a known one-to-one correspondence between every possible 
level of violation and the penalty.  
In this work we present the results of a series of laboratory economic 
experiments designed to study the compliance behavior of polluting firms when 
information on the penalty for noncompliance is uncertain.2 We examine how 
uncertainty on the penalty affects the compliance decision and the extent of violation 
under two regulatory schemes: one in which the regulator induces perfect compliance 
and another one in which it does not. This is an important matter because if uncertain 
                                                 
1 An additional example is provided by Escobar and Chávez (2013) with respect to Mexico. In the event 
of detection of noncompliance with environmental regulations on emission discharges from companies 
operating in Mexico City, the authors note that, according to the current environmental legislation, the 
amount of the penalty that may be imposed by the responsible regulatory agency should consider several 
criteria, including the severity of the offense, financial situation of the offender, intention and negligence, 
and the economic benefits of noncomplying, among others. 
2 Whenever we refer to uncertainty, we refer to the uncertainty that can be measured. We are aware of 
Knight’s distinction between risk (measurable uncertainty) and uncertainty (not measurable uncertainty). 
However, it seems better to talk about penalties of certain amounts versus penalties of uncertain amounts, 
rather than penalties of certain amounts versus penalties of risky amounts to differentiate the treatments of 
our experiments. 
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penalties decrease compliance, a regulator could increase compliance simply by making 
more transparent and clear the consequences of violations. 
We found evidence that violations increase when penalties are uncertain, 
relatively to when they are certain, but only when the regulatory design induces 
compliance. When enforcement is weak (i.e.: not sufficient to induce compliance on 
risk-neutral individuals), violations do not vary in a statistically significant way between 
certain and uncertain penalties. The results suggest that a cost-effective regulation 
design should provide full information concerning the consequences of a violation. 
  
2. Overview of the literature  
The environmental enforcement literature was built upon theoretical models that 
in almost all cases assume both a known penalty for non-compliance and risk neutrality 
on the part of the polluting firms. In the tax compliance literature, Alm et al. (1992) 
argue that a subject will respond to an increase in risk in the penalty with an increase in 
declared income, if it exhibits non-decreasing absolute risk-aversion. On the other hand, 
Harel (1999) argues that criminals would prefer a scheme in which the degree of the 
sentence is uncertain.  
De Angelo and Charness (2012) find that uncertainty in the probability of 
detection results in a significant reduction in detected offenses to a speed limit in a 
framed laboratory experiment. In contrast to De Angelo and Charness´s, our analysis 
investigates the effect of uncertainty on the level of the penalty for detected violations, 
not on the probability of being detected. In De Angelo and Charness’s (2012) design, 
the penalty imposed on detected violators is well known by the regulated population.  
The only experimental investigations of the effect of the uncertainty in the 
penalty on compliance behavior that we are aware of are Alm et. al. (1992) and Baker 
et. al. (2003). Using an income tax declaration framework, Alm et. al. (1992) find that 
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an increase in measurable uncertainty (risk) in the penalty increases compliance. Using 
a frame in which subjects choose between lotteries through which they could gain 
additional money but being fined if caught playing, Baker et al (2003) found that an 
increase in risk in the penalty for playing the lottery decreases the percentage of subjects 
playing it. The literature does not distinguish between situations in which the 
enforcement regime induces perfect compliance and those in which there is 
noncompliance. Moreover, we are not aware of any work exploring the effect of 
uncertain penalties on the level of compliance of polluters with emission standards.  
  The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the main 
hypotheses to be evaluated with our experimental design. In section 3, we describe the 
experimental design of our experiments and the procedures we used to implement them. 
Section 4 presents the results of our work.  We conclude in section 5.   
2. Hypotheses 
In this section, we present the hypotheses we test. These hypotheses are based on 
the positive theoretical literature on behavior of polluting firms under emission 
standards (Harford 1978; Stranlund 2013; Arguedas 2008; Caffera and Chávez 2011). 
In this literature, typically, a regulatory agency conducts random inspections to control 
the level of compliance of a set of  n polluting firms. If the agency detects a violation to 
the emission standard in an inspection, it imposes a fine. Firms are assumed to be risk-
neutral.  Each firm is completely described by a function of abatement costs 𝑐(𝑞) that is 
strictly decreasing and convex in the level of emissions 𝑞 [𝑐(𝑞)  <  0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐(𝑞)  >  0]. 
The environmental target is a fixed aggregate level of emissions, denoted as Q, which is 
exogenously determined by the regulatory authority.  
Each firm faces an emission standard s. The standard represents the maximum 
(legal) level of emissions that the firm can discharge, such that ∑ 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖 . In this 
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context, a violation of the standard, denoted as v, occurs when the emissions level of the 
firm exceeds the standard,  𝑣 = 𝑞 − 𝑠 > 0. The firm is audited with an exogenously 
determined probability, 𝜋. An audit provides the regulator with perfect information 
about the firm’s compliance status. If the regulator audits a firm and finds it violating 
the standard, it imposes the firm a penalty 𝑓(𝑣). Following Stranlund (2007), the 
structure of the penalty is given by 𝑓 (𝑞 – 𝑠)  =  𝜑(𝑞 –  𝑠)  + (𝛾/2)(𝑞 –  𝑠)2, where 
𝜑 > 0 and 𝛾 > 0.   
Under the described regulatory scheme, and assuming that the penalty is known 
with certainty, a firm selects the level of emission to minimize its expected compliance 
costs. These are the sum of the abatement costs and the expected penalty. A risk neutral 
firm will choose to comply with the standard (𝑞 =  𝑠) if and only if  – 𝑐′(𝑠) ≤ 𝜋𝜑 
(Heyes 2000; Malik 1992; Harford 1978). That is, a firm will comply with the standard 
if the expected penalty for marginally violating the standard is higher than the marginal 
benefit (the marginal decrease in abatement costs). We say that a regulatory scheme 
induces compliance when this compliance condition holds for every firm. When the 
condition does not hold for at least one firm, we say the regulatory scheme allows 
violations. In the case, the violating firms will select a level of emission 𝑞(𝑠, 𝜋) > 𝑠, 
where 𝑞(𝑠, 𝜋, 𝜑, 𝛾) is the solution to the equation  −𝑐′(𝑞) = 𝜋[𝜑 + 𝛾(𝑞 − 𝑠)]. 
Moreover, it is possible to show that a risk-neutral firm will not alter the level of 
emissions that choses with a given audit probability and non-random penalty, if 
confronted to a mean preserving spread of the penalty (a simple lottery or a compound 
lottery).3 Accordingly, the hypotheses to be evaluated herein are as follows. 
 
                                                 
3 This result is presented on Section 1 of the Appendix.  
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Hypothesis 1: A mean preserving spread of a penalty function does not alter the firms’ 
choice of emissions in a system of emission standards, under a regulation scheme that 
induces compliance. 
Hypothesis 2:  A mean preserving spread of a penalty function does not alter the firms’ 
choice of emissions in a system of emission standards, under a regulation scheme that 
allows non-compliance. 
3. Experimental Design and Procedure 
In this section, we present the experimental design and the procedures we used 
to implement our experiments. 
3.1. Design 
We framed the experiment as a neutral production decision of an unspecified 
good. Individuals take the role of a producer of a fictitious good from which each of 
them receive benefits per unit produced. The units produced can take values from 1 to 
10. The marginal benefits obtained from the production of this good differ among 
individuals, creating four types of subjects: two with “high” marginal benefits from 
production and two with “low” marginal benefits (see Annex 1). These schedules of 
marginal benefits are the same through all the experiments and are randomly assigned 
across subjects. Production is subject to type-specific legal maximum levels (standards). 
A regulatory authority controls compliance to these maximum levels by conducting 
random inspections and imposing penalties on those detected producing more thatn the 
standard.  
The design of the experiment considers two regulatory schemes. The first one 
induces perfect compliance. The second scheme allows violations of the standards by 
reducing the inspection rate and the emissions standards in amounts such that an 
expected profit maximizer firm would produce the same level of output in both 
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regulatory schemes.  
We construct six different treatments for this experiment (see Table 1) by 
varying the stringency of enforcement (strong and weak enforcement) and the 
(un)certainty subjects face with respect to the value of the penalty corresponding to a 
given level of violation (deterministic penalty, random penalty with simple lottery and 
random penalty with compound lottery), such that the expected value of the fine is the 
same in the three cases. All treatments consider an increasing marginal penalty. In the 
case of the deterministic penalty function, there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
each level of violation and the value of the fine. The simple lottery is mean-preserving 
spread of the deterministic penalty, in which the amount of the penalty may take a high 
value with a 50% probability or take a low value with 50% probability. Finally, in the 
case of a compound lottery penalty, subjects face a 33% chance of being penalized with 
the low value of the penalty, a 33% chance of being penalized with the high one, and a 
33% chance that the penalty is determined with the previously described simple lottery 
(high/low value with 50%). 
3.2. Procedure 
The experiments were implemented using z-tree (Fishbacher (2007)) software in 
the laboratories of the Center for Training and Learning Resources at Universidad de 
Concepción, Chile. We recruited undergraduate students from the city of Concepción 
majoring in business and economics, civil industrial engineering, and auditing at the 
following institutions: Universidad de Concepción, Universidad Católica de la 
Santísima Concepción and Universidad del Bio-Bio. The students participating in the 
experiments were sophomores or above.  
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Table 1.Parameters per treatment 
Treatment 
Probability of monitoring per 
type of firm Probability per type of 
penalty 
Parameters value 
Policy 
induces 
Aggregate
d 
standards 
Standard 
Expected 
aggregated 
level of 
emissions 
Penalty Low penalty High penalty 
Type 
1 
Type 
2 
Type 
3 
Type 
4 
Phi Gamma Phi Gamma Phi Gamma     
T1 0.6 0.65 0.63 0.66 1 100 66.67         
Compliance 40 
Type 1=7 
Type 2=6 
Type 3=4 
Type 4=3 
40 
T2 0.6 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.5 (Simple lottery)     50 33.37 150 99.9 
T3 0.6 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.5 (Compund lottery)     50 33.37 150 99.9 
T4 0.24 0.26 0.32 0.32 1 100 66.67         
Violations 20 
Type 1=4 
Type 2=3 
Type 3=2 
Type 4=1 
T5 0.24 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.5 (Simple lottery)     50 33.37 150 99.9 
T6 0.24 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.5 (Compund lottery)     50 33.37 150 99.9 
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Subjects participating in a session were randomly assigned into groups of eight 
individuals. The number of subjects showing up for a session was not always multiple 
of eight. This was not a problem because in these standards experiments the subjects do 
not relate with each other in any form.  Each eight-subject group comprised a group of 
firms regulated by a set of the emissions standards. A maximum of four groups of eight 
participated in a particular session. 
The experiment consisted of six different treatments performed over nine 
experimental sessions.4  The subjects participated in only one experimental session. In 
each session, they were exposed to two different treatments. We reversed the order of 
application of the treatments to control for potential order effects. Each treatment had 
two initial test periods and ten actual periods. At the beginning of each session, the 
experimenter read the instructions aloud with PowerPoint slides highlighting the key 
points. Two practice rounds were then allowed and subjects’ questions were answered. 5 
At the beginning of each treatment, the subjects had an initial working capital of 1,050 
experimental pesos. In their personal screen, each subject had information on the profits 
obtained per each unit produced, the limit of production, the fine for each level of 
violation and the probability of inspection. In each period, the subjects had two minutes 
to make the production decision. After all subjects in the group had made their decision, 
the computer program produced a random number between 0 and 1 for each subject. If 
this number was below the informed probability of being monitored, the subject was 
inspected. Subjects were informed in their screen whether they had been selected for 
inspection or not, and the result of the inspection (violation level, total fine and net 
profits after inspection). After this, subjects were informed in their screen the history of 
                                                 
4 The detail of the treatments conducted in each session is presented in Table A.2 in Annex 2. 
5 The English version of the instructions is available in section 2 of the Appendix. 
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their decisions in the game, the history of inspections and the history of profits, up to 
the last period just played. After 20 seconds in this screen, the next period began 
automatically. 
After completing the ten periods, the first treatment results were informed before 
beginning the second treatment. Finally, at the end of the second treatment, the personal 
screen informed subject the total amount of profits generated from both treatments. 
Finally, subjects answered an online survey to complete to gather socio-economic 
information and to elicit risk preferences.6 Each session lasted about two hours. At the 
end of the experiment, participants were paid their accumulated earnings in cash.  
Subjects were paid the equivalent to US$ 4 for showing up on time, plus what they 
earned from their participation in the experiment. The exchange rate between the 
experimental and Chilean pesos was set in order to produce an average expected 
payment for the participation in the experiment that was similar to what an advanced 
student could earn in the market for 2 hours of work. Total payments ranged between 
US$ 5.7 and US$ 22.8, with a mean value of US$ 14.9, a median of US$ 14.9 and a 
standard deviation of US$ 4.4.  
A total of 225 students participated in the experiment. We ran a total number of 
3 T1 treatments (11 groups), 3 T2 treatments (9 groups), 3 T3 treatments (9 groups), 3 
T4 treatments (11 groups), 3 T5 treatments (10 groups), and 3 T6 treatments (10 
                                                 
6 To elicit subjects’ level of risk aversion we conducted a Holt and Laury (Holt and Laury 2002) type of 
test. The subjects were confronted to 10 choices between a certain amount of money (labeled Option A 
and equal to US$38.2 and fixed across the 10 choices) and a lottery (labeled Option B). In the lottery, 
subjects could earn either US$ 14.3 or US$ 62.0. The probability of winning the higher prize varied from 
0.1 to 1 between choices 1 and 10. Our measure of risk aversion is the number of the choice in which the 
subject switches to Option B. It then varies between 1 and 10, with 10 being the highest value of risk 
aversion. (In the tenth choice the higher prize of the lottery, higher than the certain amount in option A, 
has a probability equal to 1, so every subject should choose the lottery in the 10th choice). A risk-neutral 
subject should switch from option A (the certain amount) to option B (the lottery) in the fifth or sixth 
choice. We informed the subjects that after completing the questionnaire, one subject was going to be 
chosen from the pool of subjects in the room and that she was going to be paid according to her decisions 
in the Holt and Laury choices by drawing a number between 1 and 10 from an urn. If the subject selected 
the lottery in the drawn choice, the lottery was conducted with the corresponding probabilities in the form 
of colored balls in an urn. 
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groups). Twenty four subjects went bankrupt in the experiment. Most of bankruptcies 
were concentrated in those treatments with incomplete enforcement where individuals 
had a level of production above the level predicted by the theory.7 
4. Results  
In this section, we present the results of our work. First, we present the 
descriptive analysis of the overall results. Second, we present the results of hypotheses 
tests.   
4.1. Overall Results-Descriptive analysis 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the level of emissions and 
violations observed in the perfect compliance treatments (T1, T2, and T3) by firm’s 
type.  Modal behaviors in the compliance treatments are those predicted by theory. 
However, this is not the case with average behaviors. We note that the average violation 
is positive for all types of subjects in all perfect enforcement treatments. Average 
positive levels of violations in enforcement regimes that induce compliance in the 
margin have previously been observed in the literature (see, for example, Murphy and 
Stranlund (2006 and 2007) and Stranlund et al. (2011 and 2013) and Caffera and 
Chávez (2016). Our results, however, show that as an addition to the literature, this 
result does not depend on the level of certainty regarding the amount of the penalties.  
An additional result that can be observed in Table 2 is that the mean level of 
violation increases for almost all types of firms under a random penalty with simple 
lottery (T2) with respect to a deterministic penalty (T1). The only exception is observed 
in the case of the lowest marginal abatement cost firms (firms Type 4).  A similar 
                                                 
7 In order not to lose the total number of observations in which a subject went bankrupt, we use the 
observations in the periods during which the subjects were active. The results that we present do not 
change qualitatively if we use only cases in which no subject went bankrupt. 
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qualitative result is observed also for the mean level of violation for high marginal 
abatement costs firms types under a random penalty with a compound lottery (T3) with 
respect of the baseline (T1).   
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for perfect compliance treatments 
 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
(s=7) (s=6) (s=4) (s=3) 
q v q V q v q v 
Theory 7.00 0.00 6.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 
Treatment 1 
Deterministic 
 Penalty 
Mean 7.42 0.42 6.53 0.53 4.63 0.63 4.31 1.31 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.87 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 1.11 1.11 
Mode 7 0 6 0 4 0 5 2 
Median 7 0 6 0 4 0 4.5 1.5 
# Obs. 130 130 127 127 110 110 100 100 
 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
(s=7) (s=6) (s=4) (s=3) 
q v q V q v q v 
Theory 7.00 0.00 6.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 
Treatment 2 
Random 
Penalty  
 simple 
lottery  
Mean 7.72 0.72 6.89 0.89 4.88 0.88 3.88 0.88 
Std. 
Dev. 
1.07 1.07 1.14 1.14 1.36 1.36 1 1 
Mode 7 0 6 0 4 0 3 0 
Median 7 0 7 1 4 0 4 1 
# Obs. 100 100 140 140 129 129 99 99 
 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
(s=7) (s=6) (s=4) (s=3) 
q v q V q v q v 
Theory 7.00 0.00 6.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 
Treatment 3 
Random 
Penalty 
compound 
lottery  
Mean 7.52 0.52 6.66 0.66 4.62 0.62 3.84 0.84 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.80 0.80 0.96 0.96 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 
Mode 7 0 6 0 4 0 3 0 
Median 7 0 6 0 4 0 4 1 
# Obs. 108 108 138 138 130 130 100 100 
The table shows the average, the standard deviation, the mode, the median, and the number of observations for (q) 
emissions and (v) violations. 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the case of the treatments that induce 
violations, by firms’ type. In this case, average violations are lower than the ones 
predicted for expected profit maximizers in the case of Type-1 firms (those with high 
marginal benefits and laxer standards), in all treatments. On the contrary, violations are 
almost equal or higher than those predicted by the model in the case of Type-3 and 
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Type-4 firms (those with lower marginal benefits but stricter standards). Meanwhile, 
Type-2 firms behave as predicted, on average, in the case of known penalties, but they 
show lower than predicted violations in the case of uncertain penalties (treatments 5 and 
6).  
In Caffera and Chávez (2016), we observe that in general, the level of emissions 
achieved in the imperfect compliance treatments are lower than the level achieved in the 
case of perfect compliance treatments, although both were designed to induce the same 
levels of emissions in an expected profit maximizer subject. We see here that this result 
does not change with uncertain penalties. 
Moreover, as it can be seen in Table 3, the mean level of violation under a 
random penalty with simple lottery (T5) does not differ much with respect to the level 
observed under deterministic penalty (T4). A similar qualitative result is observed also 
for the mean level of violation for high marginal abatement costs firms types under a 
random penalty with a compound lottery (T6) with respect of the baseline (T4).   
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for violation treatments 
Treatment 4 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
(s=4) (s=3) (s=2) (s=1) 
q V q V q v q v 
Theory 7 3 6 3 4 2 3 2 
Deterministic 
 Penalty 
Mean 6.09 2.09 5.93 2.93 3.99 1.99 3.76 2.76 
Std. 
Dev. 
1.97 1.97 1.91 1.91 1.23 1.23 2.07 2.07 
Mode 5 1 6 3 4 2 2 1 
Median 5 1 6 3 4 2 4 3 
# Obs. 129 129 130 130 110 110 100 100 
Treatment 5 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
(s=4) (s=3) (s=2) (s=1) 
q V q V q v q v 
Theory 7 3 6 3 4 2 3 2 
Random 
Penalty 
simple 
lottery form 
Mean 6.36 2.36 6.1 3.1 4.04 2.04 2.63 1.63 
Std. 
Dev. 
1.61 1.61 2.28 2.28 1.77 1.77 1.66 1.66 
Mode 6 2 5 2 4 2 3 2 
Median 6 2 6 3 4 2 2.5 1.5 
# Obs. 110 110 90 90 120 120 40 40 
Treatment 6 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
(s=4) (s=3) (s=2) (s=1) 
q V q V q v q v 
Theory 7 3 6 3 4 2 3 2 
Random 
Penalty  
compound 
lottery form 
Mean 6.45 2.45 5.73 2.73 3.7 1.7 3.43 2.43 
Std. 
Dev. 
1.64 1.64 2.03 2.03 1.61 1.61 2.4 2.4 
Mode 6 2 5-6 1-2 3 1 3 2 
Median 6 2 5.5 2.5 3 1 3 2 
# Obs. 110 110 90 90 120 120 40 40 
The table shows the average, the standard deviation, the mean, the median, and the number of observations for (q) 
emission and (v) violation. Descriptive statistics calculated for  the last 10 periods and positive levels of violations 
from subjects making consistent choices in the Holt and Laury lottery activity  
 
4.2. Hypotheses tests 
4.2.1 Nonparametric Tests 
 
We are interested in comparing: (i) violations under a deterministic penalty vs. 
violations under a simple lottery form of penalty, (ii) violations under a deterministic 
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penalty vs. violations under a compound lottery form of penalty and  (iii) violations 
under a simple lottery form of penalty vs. violations under a compound lottery form of 
penalty. The null hypothesis is that there are no differences between average individual 
violations across penalties by firms’ type. 
Table 4 presents the results of the Mann-Whitney tests for each comparison. The 
overall result is fairly clear. In the cases where the treatments induce compliance the 
differences in the certainty in the value of the penalty appears to affect the level of 
individual violation. This is not the case in treatments that allow for violations. 
Specifically, in the case of perfect compliance treatments, the level of violation under a 
simple lottery form of penalty (𝑣𝑠) is higher than the level of violation under a 
deterministic penalty (𝑣𝑘) and the level of violation under a compound lottery 
penalty (𝑣𝑐). Meanwhile, the level of violation under a certain penalty (𝑣𝑘) is not 
different from the level of violation under a compound lottery penalty (𝑣𝑐).   
Table 4: Mann Whitney Test by enforcement system and risk preferences 
Enforcement System 
Deterministic penalty 
vs.  
Random penalty-
Simple lottery  
Deterministic penalty 
vs.  
 
Random penalty-
Compound lottery  
Random penalty-Simple 
lottery   
vs.  
Random penalty-
Compound lottery  
H0: vk=vsl 
H1:vk≠vsl 
H0: vk=vcl 
H1:vk≠vcl 
H0: vsl=vcl 
H1:vsl≠vcl 
Rejecte
d 
Dif  
Obs 
Rejecte
d 
Dif 
Obs 
Rejecte
d 
Dif 
Obs Vk-
vsl 
Vk-
vcl 
vsl-vcl 
All firms 
Induces perfect 
compliance 
5% - 935 No  943 5% + 944 
Risk lover 1% - 70 1% - 70 No  40 
Risk Neutral No  399 1% + 408 1% + 427 
Risk averse 10% - 466 No  465 No  477 
All firms 
Induces 
violations 
No  829 No  829 No  720 
Risk lover No  90 No  90 No  80 
Risk Neutral No  320 No  320 No  260 
Risk averse No  419 No  419 No  380 
Note: Tests were performed using positive levels of violations from subjects making consistent choices in the Holt 
and Laury lottery activity.  vk= violation with deterministic penalty; vls= violation under random penalty- simple 
lottery form; vlc= violation under random penalty- compound lottery form. 
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We also test for differences in the individual levels of violation dividing the 
subjects by firms’ types. To perform these tests we divided the subjects into two groups, 
high costs subjects (Types 1 and 2) and low costs subjects (Types 3 and 4). The general 
results remain. We observe now that for the perfect compliance treatments, the level of 
violation under simple lottery penalty is higher than the level of violation under a 
compound lottery penalty for the high costs firms (see Table 5). Overall, violations of 
high cost firms are higher with random penalties than with deterministic penalties.  
Also, the results in Table 5 suggest that the results that we obtain for the case of 
treatments that allow for non-compliance are mainly driven by high cost firms, as the 
uncertainty of the penalty does seem to affect the level of violation for low cost firms. 
Table 5: Mann Whitney Test by enforcement system and firms’ type 
Enforcement System/Firms’ Type 
Deterministic penalty 
vs.  
Random penalty-
Simple lottery  
Deterministic penalty 
vs.  
Random penalty-
Compound lottery  
Random penalty-
Simple lottery vs.  
Random penalty-
Compound lottery 
H0: vk=vls 
H1:vk≠vls 
H0: vk=vlc 
H1:vk≠vlc 
H0: vls=vlc 
H1:vls≠vlc 
Rejected 
Dif  
Obs Rejected  
Dif 
Obs Rejected 
Dif 
Obs 
Vk-vls Vk-vlc Vls-vlc 
Complete 
High (types 1y 2)  1% - 497 5% - 503 10% + 486 
Low (types 3 y 4)  No  438 1%  440 No  458 
Incomplete 
High (types 1y 2)  No  459 No  459 No  400 
Low (types 3 y 4)  1% + 370 1% + 370 No  320 
The observations consider the 10 periods, v ≥ 0 and subjects making consistent choices in the Holt and Laury lottery 
activity, vk= violation under deterministic penalty; vls= violation under random penalty-simple lottery form; vlc= 
violation under random penalty compound lottery form.  
 
4.2.2 Regressions 
To complement the results of the non-parametric tests presented in the previous 
tables, we perform a regression analysis. In this regressions, the unit of analysis is the 
individual level of violation. The general specification of the estimated equations is the 
following: 
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vit =f (SIMPLEi, COMPOUNDi, FIRM-TYPEi, RISK PREFERENCESi, 
OTHERCONTROLS)      [1] 
 
where vit is the level of violation of subject i in round t; SIMPLE is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the subject faces a simple lottery penalty; COMPOUND is a similar 
variable for the case of a compound lottery penalty; FIRMTYPE is a set of three dummy 
variables to control for firms’ type, RISK PREFERENCES is a set of two dummy 
variables, each variable is equal to 1 if the subject is risk averse or risk lover.  The risk 
preference indicator was constructed using the results of the Holt and Laury test as 
previously explained in Section 3.2. The other controls employed in the regressions 
depend on the specification. We consider interacting variables between treatment and 
firm type. Finally, we included random individual effects, and we clustered errors by 
groups.8 
The results of our regression analysis are presented in Table 6. Consistent with 
the nonparametric tests, we observe that high-benefit firms seems to be the ones that 
violate more with uncertain penalties in “high” enforcement environments, with the 
effect being more statistically significant for firms of type 1 (higher benefits of 
polluting). On the other hand, we only observe a statistically weak effect for firms type 
1 in the case of enforcement regimes that allow non-compliance.  
 
 
 
                                                 
8 We also consider interacting variables between treatments and risk preferences and ran the 
specifications with and without controlling for the possibility that the subject could have been inspected 
in the previous round to explore the potential effect of being inspected in the previous period on the 
violation decision in the current period.  The results regarding treatment effects were robust to these 
different specifications. 
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Table 6. Linear random effects models-Level of violations 
Treatments induce compliance Treatments allows violations 
      
Trat2  -0.436 Trat5  -1.161* 
  (0.330)   (0.594) 
Trat3  -0.469* Trat6  -0.361 
  (0.285)   (0.854) 
RiskAverse  0.010 RiskAverse  -0.064 
  (0.126)   (0.300) 
Risklover  0.073 Risklover  0.064 
  (0.224)   (0.664) 
Type1  -0.891*** Type1  -0.679 
  (0.253)   (0.492) 
Type2  -0.791*** Type2  0.165 
  (0.265)   (0.510) 
Type3  -0.675** Type3  -0.766* 
  (0.295)   (0.399) 
Trat2xType1  0.742*** Trat5xType1  1.447* 
  (0.272)   (0.756) 
Trat2xType2  0.813* Trat5xType2  1.324 
  (0.435)   (1.163) 
Trat2xType3  0.693 Trat5xType3  1.225 
  (0.489)   (0.747) 
Trat3xType1  0.580** Trat6xType1  0.738 
  (0.274)   (0.919) 
Trat3xType2  0.605* Trat6xType2  0.158 
  (0.338)   (1.177) 
Trat3xType3  0.463 Trat6xType3  0.083 
  (0.388)   (1.018) 
Constant  1.298*** Constant  2.785*** 
  (0.228)   (0.307) 
N  1411 N  1189 
* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01     
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5. Conclusions 
In this study, we used a laboratory economic experiment to analyze compliance 
behavior of individual firms subject to emissions standards. The design considered 
exogenous variations in the stringency of enforcement to induce compliance under 
different degrees of information regarding the severity of the penalty.  
Based on our findings, the general conclusion is that uncertain penalties affects 
the level of violations of those polluting firms that have the most to profit with 
violations. But this result is only observed when the marginal expected penalty is high 
enough to induce compliance in risk-neutral firms. On the contrary, when the marginal 
expected penalty is low enough to induce risk-neutral firms to violate their standards, 
the level of uncertainty in the penalty does not affect the level of emissions of any type 
of firm. A possible interpretation is that once the enforcement level is perceived as lax, 
the information regarding the penalty neither adds nor detracts from the incentives 
affecting the decision to comply. It is only if the control system is not lax and the 
severity of the penalty is known and certain that a difference in the level of infringement 
of companies is observed, especially in companies with high marginal costs.  
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Annex 1 
Table A1. Production marginal benefits of the fictitious good per type of firm 
Produced Units 
Production marginal benefits 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
1 161 151 129 125 
2 145 134 113 105 
3 130 119 98 88 
4 116 106 84 74 
5 103 95 73 63 
6 91 86 63 54 
7 80 79 53 47 
8 70 74 44 42 
9 61 70 35 38 
10 53 67 27 35 
Source: Cason and Gangadharan (2006). 
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Annex 2 
Table A.2. Detail of treatments conducted in each session 
Session Treatment Compliance Penalty 
1 
2 Perfect Random-Simple lottery 
3 Perfect Random-Compound lottery 
2 
5 Violations Random-Simple lottery 
6 Violations Random-Compound lottery  
3 
3 Perfect Random-Compound lottery  
2 Perfect Random-Simple lottery 
4 
6 Violations Random-Compound lottery 
5 Violations Random-Simple lottery 
5 
1 Perfect Deterministic 
4 Violations Deterministic 
6 
4 Violations Deterministic 
1 Perfect Deterministic 
7 
1 Perfect Deterministic 
4 Violations Deterministic 
8 
5 Violations Random-Simple lottery 
6 Violations Random-Compound lottery 
9 
2 Perfect Random-Simple lottery 
3 Perfect Random-Compound lottery 
 
 
 
 
 
  
